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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
INTERMOUNTAIN FARMERS 
ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff & Appellant, 
vs. 
JIM FITZGERALD, 
Defendant & Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
CASE NO. 14723 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a money judgment in favor of defendant on a Counter-
claim. The case was brought by plaintiff to recover the amount due to it on an 
open account for sale of feed to defendant. Some months later, defendant was 
permitted to file an Amended Answer and Counterclaim for injuries and death to 
his dairy herd allegedly caused by toxic levels of urea and alleged inconsistencies 
and deficiency of protein in the feed. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT 
After a nine day trial before a jury, Judgments on the Special Verdict of 
the jury in favor of plaintiff on its Complaint in the amount of $44, 175 .00, and for 
defendant on his Counterclaim in the amount of $226 ,330. 57, were made and entered 
on May 19, 19 76, by the Court, Hon. Gordon R. Hall, presiding. Thereafter, on 
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July 20, 1976, the lower court denied Motions by plaintiff for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict and for new trial. The Judgment in favor of plaintiff was not 
appealed. 
RELIBF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an order reversing the Judgment in favor of defendant on 
the Counterclaim as a matter of law, and award of attorney's fees on the Judgment 
in plaintiff's favor. In the alternative, plaintiff seeks a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The transcript in this case is voluminous, so it has been abstracted pur-
suant to order of this Court. References hereinafter to the testimony at trial are 
to the Transcript (Tr.) and to the Abstract (Ab.) Other references are to the 
Record (R. ) • 
Plaintiff as an agricultural cooperative association sold "14% Dairy Feed" 
to defendant on an open account. Sales were made by invoice, and the total of 
unpaid invoices plus interest on the running open account amounted to $44,175.0~ 
The invoices provided for attorney's fees, and the defendant admitted knowledge 
of that fact. (Tr. 9 71; Ab. 129) The feed was delivered to the defendant's farm 
from the Spanish Fork branch of lntermountain Farmers Association. 
The feed plaintiff sold to defendant was always "14% Dairy Feed" comprised 
basically of rolled grains, plus a 32% supplement and molasses. (Tr. 223; Ab. 
2) The 32% supplement which was added to the 14% dairy feed was obtained from 
the Draper branch of plaintiff, and was mixed at the Spanish Fork plant using 
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either 300 or 350 pounds per ton of the 32% supplement, depending upon the formula 
being used at the time . 
The defendant claimed at trial that his dairy herd became beset with bloat, 
loss of milk production and other problems including death, and that such prob-
lems were caused by the feed purchased from plaintiff. The first seven counts 
of defendant's Counterclaim alleged that plaintiff's feed had a usable protein 
deficiency , that there was an inconsistent usable protein content, and that the 
feed contained excess urea. Count Eight asked for punitive damages for willfully 
and intentionally manufacturing and selling to defendant feed containing deficient 
protein and excess urea, after having been informed that its labels were false and 
misleading. As presented in Special Interrogatories, the jury was asked to 
determine whether the feed delivered by plaintiff "contained levels of urea and 
protein inconsistent with its guarantee." (R. 140) The "guarantee" referred to 
was the label or tag provided by plaintiff setting forth the chemical analysis of 
the feed for sale. The theory of defendant's Counterclaim was alleged negligence 
in mixing and providing the 14% dairy feed, not breach of warranty or "guarantee." 
(R. 23-28; Tr. 841; Ab. 173) 
Productivity of Defendant's Dairy Herd 
Defendant used plaintiff's feed less than three years in total time. (13 
months between February 1971 and February 1972, and 19 months between 
December 1972 and July 1974) Over that three year period, defendant moved 
his dairy herd from American Fork to Elberta where he built a large, modem 
dairy complex. Defendant also increased his herd from the 80 cows he had 
-3-
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initially purchased in an estate settlement to approximately 300 cows. At the 
time defendant began feeding his cows IFA feed, the yearly average milk produc-
tion per cow of his dairy herd was 372 pounds less than the Salt Lake County 
average. During the periods of time that defendant's cows were consuming the 
allegedly contaminated feed purchased from plaintiff, the milk production of defen 
herd increased steadily, and by 1974 exceeded the Salt Lake County average by 
1,688 pounds per cow. The uncontradicted evidence (Exhibit 63-P) in this regard 
was as follows: 
Average lbs . Milk Average lbs. Milk 
Per Year Per Cow Per Year Per Cow 
Defendant's Dai!:I Cows Difference Salt Lake Coun~ 
1970 12,584 -372 12,956 
1971 14,544 +1,358 13,186 
1972 14,454 +l,062 13,392 
1973 14,320 +1,230 13,090 
1974 14,675 +1,688 12,987 
1975 15,153 +l,657 13,496 
No Evidence of Harmful Feed Actually Purchased by Defendant 
The uncontroverted evidence is that the defendant purchased 14% Dairy 
Feed from the plaintiff during two periods of time, the first, between February 11. 
1971, and January 5, 1972, and the second, between December 28, 1972 andJufy 
26, 1974. 
There was no direct evidence by way of chemical test or otherwise that 
any of the loads of 14% Dairy Feed actually purchased by defendant during the 
aforesaid periods when his cows were feeding was h.armful. During the time 
periods in question, no tests by the State Chemist were taken of feed sold at the 
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Spanish Fork branch. During the relevant time periods, only eleven of the 77 
tests by the office of the Utah State Chemist finally admitted into evidence were 
analyses of 14% Dairy Feed samples, all of which were taken at locations other 
than the Spanish Fork branch of plaintiff. I) According to both parties' expert 
witnesses, Drs. Gardner and Huber, none of the chemical tests on 14% dairy feed 
showed an excess of urea which would cause a loss of milk production, or any 
other of the symptoms of toxicity complained of by defendant. (Tr. 795 ,877; Ab. 121,20i 
Evidence of Alleged Contamination of 32% Supplement Which Could Have Been 
Mixed Into Feed Purchased by Defendant 
There was no direct evidence that any contaminated 32% supplement or con-
centrate was in fact mixed into the feed which defendant purchased. Of the total 
of 772) chemical tests which were received into evidence, 24 represented test 
1) Many tests were taken of samples of plaintiff's feed which were never admitted 
into evidence. Of the 77 chemical tests admitted into evidence, 26 were tests of 
14% Dairy Feed. Those 26 tests may be analyzed as follows: 
Taken before or after relevant time periods - 15 tests 
Taken during the relevant time periods - 11 tests 
Taken at branches of IFA other than Spanish Fork during the relevant 
time periods - 11 tests; before or after the relevant time periods -
12 tests 
Taken at Spanish Fork IFA Branch during the relevant time periods - no 
tests; before or after the relevant time periods - 3 tests 
Comment made by State Chemist that sample showed an excess of NPN 
(urea) on tests taken during the relevant time periods - none; on 
tests taken before or after the relevant time periods - 2 tests (neither 
of which was taken at Spanish Fork) 
2) Many tests were taken of samples of plaintiff's feed supplement which were 
never admitted into evidence. Of the 77 chemical tests admitted into evidence, 51 were 
tests of 32% feed supplement. Those 51 tests may be analyzed as follows: 
Taken before or after relevant time periods - 27 tests 
Taken during the relevant time periods - 24 tests 
-5-
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samples of 32% supplement taken during the relevant time periods Furth 
· er, oncy 
two of the tests during the relevant time periods indicated an excess of u . 
rea, an, 
those two tests were of samples taken at branches other than Spanish Fork. 
Defendant's witness, Dr. Robert Gardner, testified that two of the 24sampi 
tested during the time periods in question contained sufficient excess urea to caw 
the type of problems complained of by the defendant. One of those chemical tes~. 
Exhibit 130-D, test report number 9870, was an analysis of 32% dairy concentrate 
sampled from the St. George branch ofIFA on February 18, 1971, seven daysafte 
the defendant began using plaintiff's feed. The other test, Exhibit 116-D, was an 
analysis of 32% cattle supplement sampled from the Draper branch of IFA on Ju~I 
1974, one day before defendant quit using plaintiff's feed. No testimony or evid1 
was presented that the concentrate identified in Exhibit 130-D, or the cattle sup-
plement identified in Exhibit 116-D, was in fact used in the preparation at SpanW 
Fork of any of the feed which the defendant's cows ate. 
Evidence of Alleged Contamination of Feed at Other Times and Other Places 
Which Could Not Have Been Purchased by Defendant 
Chemical tests which were taken at branches other than the Spanish Fork 
branch of IFA, at times both prior and subsequent to the periods when defendant' 
Taken at branches of IFA other than Spanish Fork during the relevant 
time periods - 26 tests; before or after the relevant time periods· 
24 tests 
0 Taken at Spanish Fork IFA branch during the relevant time periods · n 
tests; before or after the relevant time periods - 1 test PN 
Comment made by State Chemist that sample showed an excess ofN 
(urea) on tests taken during the relevant time periods - 2 tests 
(neither of which was taken from Spanish Fork); on tests tak~~ 
before or after the relevant time periods - 4 tests (none of whi 
was taken at Spanish Fork) ~ 
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r 
cows were feeding on plaintiff's feed, were admitted into evidence over objection 
of plaintiff's counsel. Counsel for defendant often offered these remote exhibits 
for the limited purpose of showing alleged knowledge or notice on the part of IFA 
as related to Count Eight for punitive damages. Tests taken after the periods of 
feeding which were admitted over objection of counsel include Exhibits 12-D, 13-
D, 14-D, 15-D, 16-D, 110-D, 111-D, 112-D, 113-D, 114-D, 115-D, 125-D, 126-D, 
127-D and 129-D (test report numbers 2779, 2746 and 4975) and 130-D (test report 
numbers 75-2833 and 75-3670). The Transcript shows the following relative to 
Exhibits 13 through 16: 
MR. BLONQUIST: Offer 13. 
MR. CONDIB: Your Honor, I would object to this. This is 
approximately six months from the time the feed was purchased by 
the defendant and is from a branch other than Spanish Fork; totally 
irrelevant and I don't know for what purpose it could be admissible 
consistent with the pleadings in this case. · 
MR. BLONQUIST: Briefly that there was notic~ given and 
no move upon the part of Intermountain Farmers to--I think this 
ties into the punitive element. 
THE COURT: This is some substantial time after the period 
of time that we are concerned with in this case. (Tr. 271; Ab. 12) 
* * * 
MR. BLONQUIST: We would offer 14. 
MR. CONDIB: I would object on the same grounds, Your 
Honor. This covers a period of time after the feed was pur~ased 
from the plaintiff and is a test from a branch other than Spanish 
Fork. (Tr. 272; Ab. 13) 
* * * 
MR. BLONQUIST: We will offer 15. 
-7-
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MR. CONDIE: Same objection, Your Honor. It covers a 
period after the time the feed was purchased and from a branch 
other than Intermountain Farmers Association, (sic] June 11th, 
1975. (Tr. 273; Ab. 13) 
* * * 
MR. BLONQUIST: We would offer 16. 
MR. CONDIE: Same objection, Your Honor. (Tr. 274; 
Ab. 13) 
These exhibits and all other exhibits taken subsequent to the time defendant 
stopped buying plaintiff's feed were offered as solely relating to punitive darnag~ 
(Tr. 502; Ab. 57), but were admitted into evidence generally over objection of 
counsel. (Tr. 276; Ab. 13) 
Similarly, exhibits taken prior to the time periods during which defendanl 
fed his cows plaintiff's feed were offered solely as related to the punitive damage 
element, but were admitted over objection of counsel. (Exhibits 4-D, 5-D, 11-D, 
89-D, 90-D , 92-D, 94-D , 95-D , 99-D , 100-D , 104-D, 128-D (test report numbers 
6263 and 4090), 129-D (test report numbers 9066 and 4804), 130-D (test report 
numbers 3333, 5204, 5624, 5 722, 6722 and 9061) and Exhibit 149-D l For instance, 
with reference to samples taken in 1970 as set forth in Exhibit 149-D, the transcrii: 
reads: 
MR. BLONQUIST: We would offer 149 which consists of 
four pieces of paper; 149 and then number 70-5624, 70-6271, 
and 70-280. 
MR. CONDIE: Your Honor, I would object to their admis-
sion on two grounds; They cover a period of time not in question 
and number two, they cover feed which there is no testimony to 
support has ever been used by the defendant's cows. 
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MR. BLONQUIST: If you will recall, Your Honor, this 
issue was raised to all of the tests for the year 1970; and pur-
suant to Mr. Condie's objections I withdrew those exhibits. The 
only ones I seek to show now are just those four which go to the 
question of whether or not prior to the time Mr. Fitzgerald bought 
feed from Intermountain Farmers Association they had knowledge 
that their feed did not comply with the label, and it is for that limited 
purpose that they are offered. He objected to all of them and I believe 
that that was a proper objection; we are now going to the issue of 
knowledge and the fact that they were notified that the guarantee 
was not met, which I think goes to the essential elements of this 
case. (Tr. 817; Ab. 126) 
Again, the chemical tests relating to these samples were received into evidence 
generally over objection. (Tr. 818; Ab. 127) This particular exhibit contained 
the following notation under date of May 4, 1970 from the State Chemist's office: 
"This label is false and misleading . We have encountered a number of these 
during this year." 
Similar discussion was had resulting in ultimate receipt into evidence of 
other chemical tests which admittedly could not possibly hav~ related to alleged 
contamination of the feed actually purchased by defendant. (Tr. 502-504; Ab. 
57) 
Confusion as to the Use and Purpose of Exhibits Which Could Not Show and 
Were Not Offered to Show that the Feed Purchased and Used by Defendant 
was Contaminated 
The bulk of the chemical tests admitted into evidence related only to Count 
Eight, punitive damages. All test reports prior and subsequent to the periods 
in question were offered for the limited purpose of establishing plaintiff's alleged 
knowledge and notice justifying punitive damages. (Tr. 817; Ab. 126; Tr. 502; 
Ab. 57) [Exhibits 4-D, 5-D, 11-D, 12-D, 13-D, 14-D, 15-D, 16-D, 89-D, 90-D • 
-9-
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92-D, 94-D, 95-D, 99-D, 100-D, 104-D, 110-D, 111-D, 112-D, 113-D, 114-D 
' 
115-D, 125-D, 126-D, 127-D, 128-D (test report numbers 6263 and 4090), 129·D 
(test report numbers 9066, 2779, 2746 and 4804), Exhibit 130-D (test report num-
bers 3333, 5204, 5624, 5722, 6722, 9061, 75-2833 and 75-3670) and Exhibit 149-DJ 
Exhibit 12-D , a sample taken after defendant stopped purchasing feed from 
IFA, on August 15, 1974, was one such exhibit in the aforesaid category which 
could not have caused contamination in the actual feed, and could not have been 
a component ingredient of the actual feed used by defendant. The Court initially 
admitted Exhibit 12 into evidence without restriction, but at a later point in the 
trial apparently sustained objection as to its applicability and use for purposes 
other than punitive damages. The record shows the following: 
MR. BLONQUIST: We would offer Exhibit 12. 
MR. coNDm: I would object to the introduction of this 
exhibit, Your Honor. It covers a time subsequent to the time 
when the defendant purchased feed from Intermountain Farmers; 
and is also from a branch which is not Spanish Fork. 
THE COURT: 12 is received over that objection. (Tr. 270; 
Ab. 12) 
* * * 
MR. BLONQUIST: Referring Your Honor to Exhibit 12-D 
and it is specifically, the record will show , sampled on August 
15th of 1974 which is within the time in question in this case. 
MR. CONDm: Your Honor (this) is one month after they 
quit using Intermountain Farmers Associatio_n feed'. and there-
fore no cow in his dairy could have eaten this particular sample 
or anything like it. . . . 
THE COURT: Yes. Doesn't appear to be within the time 
that is in question and the objection is sustained. 
-10-
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MR. BLONQUIST: Your Honor, I think in ruling on that 
the Court also ought to take into consideration the other elements. 
oft.he case we have talked about earlier; that was the basis upon 
which the Court allowed the exhibit in at the beginning of this 
litigation. That was the fact that one of our charges in this case 
was one of the punitive or exemplary damages . And the notice 
that was involved certainly goes to that issue and that close in 
time because with that element of the case, Your Honor, I think 
would make the document clearly admissible. 
I, also I failed to mention that in my argument I would ask 
the Court to reconsider in considering that ground. 
MR. CONDIE: Your Honor, I'll stipulate and it is in the 
record that that particular document shows what it shows. If 
that's notice then it is notice. But I don't believe any testimony 
relative to these percentage questions of a feed which his cows 
could never have eaten is relevant. 
THE COURT: The ruling will stand. (Tr. 710, 711; Ab. 99) 
There was confusion as to the use and scope of exhibits other than Exhibit 
12-D which were identified, objected to, a ruling reserved, admitted without 
restriction and later restricted in some partieular. [See Exhibit 15-D; Tr. 704, 
711; Ab. 98, 99; and Exhibit 129-D (testreportnumber9068); Tr. 900; Ab. 209.] 
Against this background and confusion as to the limitations suggested in 
the presence of the jury, the court recognized the need for some curative instruc-
lion so as to give guidance to the jury in its deliberations. Many exhibits had been 
admitted and discussed before the jury for the sole purpose of showing alleged 
punitive damages . Without identifying the exhibits in question, the court gave 
the following instruction to the jury: 
You are instructed that certain exhibits hereinafter 
enumerated have been offered and admitted into evidence by 
the court as bearing upon the question of notice to the plaintiff 
of a deficiency in its feed. You are instructed that said exhibits 
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should not be considered for any other purpose or as bearing 
upon any other issue and do not constitute proof of any other 
claim made by the counterclaimant in this case. (Instruction No. 
20, R. 121) 
Although the instruction was given as aforesaid, in fact there was no enumer31il 
as to the exhibits referred to in the instruction. The jury was left without 
any guidance or instruction as to which exhibits were so restricted. Neverthelesi 
all exhibits were taken into the jury room without notation or indication as to whi~ 
were so restricted or limited. 
Jury was Permitted to Regard any Evidence of "Misbranding" or "Adulteration' 
of Feed as Constituting Negligence Per Se 
to: 
The Court gave the following instructions, which were strenuously objectei 
Section 4-18-18 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953) states 
as follows: 
Misbranded feed. -- No person shall distribute 
misbranded feed. A commercial feed shall be 
deemed to be misbranded: If its labeling is false 
or misleading in any particular. 
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that 
plaintiff misbranded its feed sold to the defendant in violation 
of the statute just read to you, which is proposed for the safety 
of defendant and others who own dairy cows , such conduct 
constituted negligence as a matter of law. (Instruction No. 
16 , R . 11 7) [Emphasis added . 1 
* * * 
Section 4-18-17 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953) reads 
as follows: 
Adulterated feed. -- No person shall distribute 
an adulterated feed. A commercial feed or custom 
mix feed shall be deemed to be adulterated: 
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1. If any poisonous, deleterious or non-nutritive 
ingredient has been added in sufficient amount to 
render it injurious to health when fed in accordance 
with directions for use on the label. 
2. If any valuable constituent has been in whole or 
part omitted or abstracted therefrom or any less 
valuable substance substituted therefor. 
3. If its composition of quality falls below or differs 
from that which it is purported or is represented to 
possess by its labeling. 
4. If it contains added hulls, screenings, straw , cobs, 
or other high fiber material unless the name of each 
such material is stated on the label. 
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the 
plaintiff manufactured and sold feed to the defendant in viDtation 
of the statute just read to you, which is proposed for the safety 
of defendant and others who own dairy cows , such conduct 
constitutes negligence as a matter of law. (Instruction No. 
17 , R . 118) [Emphasis added.] 
There was no curative or other instruction to indicate that any evidence whatso-
ever, other than some evidence of misbranding or adulterati9n, would be necessary 
in order for the jury to determine the existence of negligence. Nor were the above 
instructions limited to consideration of defendant's Count VIII regarding punitive 
damages which is the only Count raising the issue of alleged misbranding of feed 
by plaintiff. 
Evidence of Possible Causes of the Alleged Injuries Suffered by Defendant 
Other than Contaminated Feed 
Evidence was presented by several witnesses that reduction in milk production, 
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in feeding and milking procedures, seasonal changes and weather conditions, 
changing the location of the herd, introducing new cows into the herd, communicabl 
disease among the herd, and a variety of such other common place reasons. Additi~ 
evidence was presented that general poor health conditions of a herd results in 
low milk production . 
According to defendant's own witness, Dr. Gardner, the chief causes of 
losses in milk production would include the following: 
DR. GARDNER: Weather conditions such as seasonal 
changes, communicable diseases in the herd, serious malfunc-
tion of the milking equipment so it's injurious to the cows and 
affects their milk production. It's things -- changes of milkers --
milkers who don't completely remove the milk from the cow . If 
a major change in the feeding system so that you say delete grain 
from the ration -- semi starve the animal it has a very significant 
effect in depressing milk production or any poisonous or toxic 
factor that might be in the feed. (Tr. 788; Ab. 106) 
Defendant's witness and veterinarian, Dr. Roper, also testified that there 
were a number of reasons for milk production fluctuation including inadequate 
feedings, insufficient milkings, the cows' hooves being sore, a dog chasing the 
cows all night, the cows being in heat or menstruating, the cows contracting 
pneumonia or a hardwear disease, and innumerable other reasons. (Tr. 269, 
570; Ab. 65) 
One of the defendant's milkers, Mr. Ed Aragon, testified that consistent 
feeding and milking programs are important in maintaining milk production, as 
is a consistent personal relationship between the milkers and the cows. Mr. Ar 
readily admitted that milkers were usually to blame for milk production fluctuation 
stating: 
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MR. ARAGON: If you can't keep your production up on 
your cows your employer -- you can't remain with him. He 
can't keep you because in my experience with milkers and cows, 
about 90 percent milk production is a milker, the man that pulls 
the milk out of the cow is 90 percent of it as far as I can see. (Tr. 
585; Ab. 68) 
During the time period in question, Mr. Fitzgerald had employed several 
different milkers, including Mr. Aragon (Tr. 583; Ab. 63; Tr. 594; Ab. 69), 
Mr. Dallas Schrimer, who had "very little experience as a milker" (Tr. 641; Ab. 81) 
and Mr. Harvey Cook. (Tr. 679; Ab. 89) At times when the herd was still located 
in American Fork, Mr. Fitzgerald and his wife also milked the cows. (Tr. 583; 
Ab. 63) In addition to the changes in milkers, defendant's herd of 80 cows was 
moved from American Fork to Elberta where new cows were introduced into defen-
dant' s herd until it numbered approximately 300 cows. Defendant then changed 
the milking program from twice a day milking to three time milking, and, correspond-
ingly, defendant's feeding program was adjusted so that the cows' consumption 
of grain and hay would be markedly increased. Testimony was received that all 
such changes in the daily routine of a dairy herd could cause fluctuations in its 
milk production. 
that: 
With respect to the general causes of bloat problems, Dr. Huber testified 
. . . the most common cause of bloat is a legume-type bloat; 
and this bloat results from consumption of alfalfa primarily; 
could be in the pasture, green chop or hay form . Generally 
in the green chop will tend toward more bloat than the dry 
hay but it has been reported on a number of occasions where 
certain alfalfa from that are in the dry hay form and will cause 
bloat. (Tr. 884; Ab. 204) 
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During the times of purchase and use of plaintiff's 14% dairy feed, defendant also 
fed his cows as much as 45 pounds of alfalfa per day. Further, he admitted that 
he had had a severe bloat problem in June 1972 which he attributed to the green 
chopped alfalfa he had been feeding to his cows. (Tr. 1020; Ab. 141) In addition 
to the alfalfa, defendant fed his cows corn silage during the relevant times ofpur 
of 14% dairy feed. 
Relative to general poor health conditions of a herd as resulting in milk 
production loss, the testimony of Curtis Solomon and Ed Aragon revealed that 
the defendant's cows had rough, straggley coats and dull, droopy eyes which is 
a symptom of infection in cows. Defendant's cows were unresponsive, hard to 
handle and listless, had evidence of mucus in their droppings and were. "in a gen 
poor health condition." (Tr. 426; Ab . 40) Defendant also testified that his cows 
suffered from udder problems, mastitis, trychosis, pneumonia and other things, 
in addition to the problems with bloat that he is claiming losses for. (Tr. 1145; 
Ab. 184) 
·Attempted Negation of Possible Causes of Alleged Damage to Defendant's 
Herd -- Other than Contaminated Feed 
Defendant and his employees testified that during the two periods of time 
in question the dairy herd suffered from such various problems as uneasiness, 
regurgitation, excessive salivation, bloat, staggering, abortion of their calves, 
general poor health and dull eyes. (Tr. 1013-1014; Ab. 140; Tr. 426; Ab. 40; 
Tr. 590-597; Ab. 69, 70; Tr. 647-648, 654-667; Ab. 82-87) The only testimony 
presented linking such symptoms to the consumption of excessive amounts of 
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urea by dairy cows was that of defendant's witness, Dr. Robert Gardner, and to 
a limited extent, that of defendant's veterinarian, Dr. Roper. (Tr. 695; Ab. 94-
95; Tr. 560; Ab. 63) 
In an attempt to eliminate other feed stuffs fed by defendant to his cows as 
causative of the damages, evidence was presented showing that the alfalfa, corn 
silage, barley and water used by defendant on his farm in Elberta were tested and 
analyzed in 1974, at the Woodson-Tenant Laboratories (Tr. 462-467; Ab. 48-49) 
and Edward S. Babcock & Sons Laboratories (Tr. 473-479; Ab. 50-51). All elements 
tested were claimed by defendant's expert witnesses to be within normal ranges 
for each such element, but no tests were requested or made as to the urea (NPN) 
content, which at trial was asserted to be the prime claimed toxic problem. 
A pellet claimed by Curtis Solomon to be a 32% pellet manufactured by 
plaintiff was also analyzed by Woodson-Tenant Laboratories (Tr. 451; Ab. 45) 
and was shown to have a 24% protein content (Tr. 466; Ab. 48), but again no test 
to determine the urea (NPN) content of the pellet was requested or conducted. 
(Tr. 468; Ab. 49) 
In attempting to negate other factors as possible causes of defendant's 
problems, a wholly hypothetical approach was employed. (Tr. 738-742; Ab. 
106-107) Referring to defendant's milk production as reflected on Exhibit 136, 
a chart prepared by defendant, Dr. Gardner testified as follows: 
Q (By Mr. Blonquist): So my question is, do you have 
an opinion as to whether that decline is related to weather 
conditions? 
A (By Dr. Gardner): Yes. I do. 
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Q Would you please tell the jury what your opinion is? 
A According to experience I have, the observations 
made on dairy herds , this is not a seasonal change as far as 
the depression of milk production. 
Q And that's for the reason you have stated? 
A Right. (The cows usually start increasing their milk 
production during the fall months . ) 
Q Doctor, I would like you to assume . . . there was one 
sick cow in the herd. Do you have an opinion as to whether 
the sickness of the herd would be responsible for the decline? 
A Yes. 
Q What is that opinion? 
A Obviously not a problem if it had been only one cow 
been diagnosed as sick. 
Q Assume for a moment, Doctor, during that period that 
the owner had the hoofs of their herd trimmed; do you have an 
opinion as to whether that would cause the decline shown? 
A Yes. 
Q What is that opinion? 
A If the herd was all trimmed at once you would expect 
maybe a period of two weeks where for the animals to recover 
if the hoofs have been trimmed so close as that they were tender 
and painful for the cow to walk; otherwise, you couldn't expect 
a prolonged problem. So I wouldn't in this case, the evidence 
would suggest there was not a hoof trimming problem. 
Q Doctor, assume that during this period the same person 
milked the cows during that time; did you have an opinion as to 
whether or not that decline would be responsible to the milker, 
responsible for that decline? 
A Yes. 
Q What is that opinion? 
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r A I would discount that as an observation to the probable 
cause of this decline. 
Q You would discount it, but not eliminate it, sir? 
A Not eliminate it. 
Q Doctor, if, during this period in question the herd 
consumed 14 percent dairy feed that had an inconsistent 
ingredient of protein equivalent from non-protein nitrogen; 
by that I mean high one month and low the next; do you have 
an opinion as to whether or not the decline shown on that 
exhibit would be a result of the inconsistencies in protein 
equivalent from non-protein nitrogen? 
A Yes , if I know what the inconsistency is. 
Q All right. Doctor, do you have an opinion as to whether 
or not the decline shown there would be a result of excess urea 
in the feed, if the feed consumed by the cows during that 
month contained 350 pounds of a 32 percent concentrate that 
contained 26. 8 percent protein equivalent derived from non-
protein nitrogen, consumed by the animal at the rate of 32 
pounds per day? 
A Is this being offered to the cows every day during that 
period? 
Q Well, no. With no acclimation but at the outset and 
then inconsistent amounts from that time on? 
A Yes. I have an opinion. 
Q What is that opinion? 
A I think it's very probable for this to have a toxic effect 
on these cows and also reduce their milk production. 
(Tr. 738-742; Ab. 106-107) 
There was absolutely no evidence offered to support the hypothetical assumptions 
suggested by counsel to the expert witness. No actual evidence was offered or 
received as to weather conditions , sickness among the herd or hoof trimming. 
Apart from the hypothetical assumptions which were presented to the jury, 
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no evidence was before the jury as to the aforesaid matters. The most damning 
evidence of the assumptions entertained by the expert witness , relating to alleg~ 
consumption of high protein and inconsistencies , was really set forth in the ques-
tion by counsel (which in substance and effect constituted his "testimony"), and 
was never tied to fact or eVidence. 
Irreg]!larities Concerning Evidence Relating to Damages 
Counsel for defendant prepared certain exhibits which were a composite 
in summary form of several items , including matters allegedly compiled from 
internal revenue records and other sources never offered or received in ev:idence. 
These exhibits related fundamentally to damages: 
Exhibit 146-D - "Cows Sold for Beef'' - Claimed damage of 
$63,400.00 
Exhibits 161-D and 162-D - "Reasons Cows Ate More Grain" 
Claimed damage of $159 , 638. 00 
Exhibit 163-D - 11 60 Retarded Cows" - Claimed damage of 
$98,600.00 
Exhibit 138-D - "Death Losses" - Claimed damage of 
$33,812.00 
Exhibit 139-D - "Milk Losses" - Claimed damage of 
$136,330.55 
All of the aforesaid exhibits were refused after substantial discussion before 
the jury. (Tr. 1153-1156; Ab. 186-187) The defendant Fitzgerald thereafter was 
permitted to testify, holding in his hand each of the aforesaid exhibits, and read· 
ing the materials verbatim into the record. As to the matter of cows allegedly 
culled from the herd and sold for beef because of the mal effects of plaintiff's feed. 
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r M<. Blonqul" on "veral oe""'ions "tempted to h>troduce Exhibit 146-D. Tho 
Court admonished that the defendant Fitzgerald should not read from the document: 
THE COURT: Now, Mr. Blonquist, you are asking him 
again now to read from this proposed exhibit. 
MR. BLONQUIST: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: The Court would not permit him to do that 
because he is reading from a document that has been marked as 
an exhibit which has not yet been received. 
MR. BLONQUIST: Correct. 
THE COURT: And at such time as it is received, the 
exhibit will speak for itself and there's no need for this witness 
to read that document to the Court. 
(Tr. 1081; Ab. 156) 
Objection was made that the exhibit was based in part upon records not in the 
courtroom (Tr. 1083; Ab. 157), and after some discussion the court sustained 
the objection. (Tr. 1084; Ab. 157) The matter was again argued later and the 
objection again sustained. (Tr. 1153-1156; Ab. 186-187) 
Notwithstanding the prior rulings, defendant was thereafter permitted 
to take the refused exhibits and read them verbatim into the record. This was 
done without further objection of counsel, on the supposition that all rights had 
been reserved. Defendant Fitzgerald was permitted to take the documents and 
"start at the front and go clear through." (Tr. 1158; Ab. 188) At first this recita-
lion by defendant appeared to be accomplished from memory, but a comparison of 
the record to the refused exhibits makes it clear that the information from the 
exhibits was read verbatim into the record. (Tr. 1042-1084; 1157-1167; Ab. 145-
147, 187-192) The court suggested a procedure to expedite testimony by requesting 
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that defendant refer only to certain columns on Exhibit 146 (Tr. 1162-1163; Ab. 
190), and with this apparent judicial sanction, counsel for defendant acknowJedg~ 
that Fitzgerald had "just completed reading." 
Similarly, other exhibits relating to defendant's damages were not only 
summaries of DHIA records previously admitted into evidence and of defendant's 
oral testimony, but also based upon alleged income tax returns (which were 
repeatedly referred to, but never presented in court or admitted in evidence). 
The court properly refused the proposed exhibits on the basis that such exhibits 
were summaries of records not previously introduced into evidence. (Tr. 1156; 
Ab. 187) For instance, as to Exhibit 139-D , Mr. Fitzgerald admitted that the deatn 
losses being asserted had been set forth for tax purposes "in my tax folders theri.' 
(Tr. 1051; Ab. 148) Those tax folders were never offered or admitted. In arrivilJi 
at the values for alleged loss of milk production , Mr. Fitzgerald said: 
. . . I have in my tax folders , a ticket from each month from 
the company I sold my milk to, which gives the value they paid 
me for the milk_for that-month. 
Q And do you have those with you? 
A Yes. There, in that whole bunch of brown envelopes 
right in front of you. 
MR. BLONQUIST: (Indicating.) 
MR. CONDIB: You're referring to Count Number Two 
now? 
MR. BLONQUIST: Count Number Four. 
MR. CONDIB: Thank you. 
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THE WITNESS: This is a ticket from Beatrice Foods-
Meadow Gold Dairies which has so many pounds of milk at $9. 52 
carton weight and that's a hundred pounds. I have one of these 
for each of the months for every year I produced milk. (Indicating. ) 
MR. BLONQUIST: All right. The use of the DHI record on 
those Beatrice Food stubs were then used by you in the prepara-
tion of the computation that you are about to give, is that correct? 
A Th at' s correct. 
(Tr. 1051; Ab. 148) 
Relating the aforesaid to how he had computed his damages , Mr. Fitzgerald again 
referred to the tickets, brown folders, and other records which were never intro-
duced as being the basis for the alleged damages. 
. . . After I had taken the number of cows times the loss per 
day and got a total number of pounds lost that month; I took that 
figure, times the figure off of these things you just referred to in 
the tax notices that invoice slip of how much I got for milk for that 
month, and I come up with a figure at the end of that of the total 
loss in dollars per month that I had lost on milk losses for that 
month. (Tr. 1052; Ab. 148) 
The court reserved its ruling as to admissibility of each of the exhibits which had 
been constructed from records above described, and finally rejected all of the 
exhibits. (Tr. 1156; Ab. 187) 
Notwithstanding such background, defendant was thereafter permitted to 
testify and read from each of the refused exhibits, and in closing argument, counsel 
for the defendant referred to the pile of Beatrice Food tickets which were stacked 
upon counsel table as evidence of defendant's damages. That all of this was confusing 
to the jury is evident from the fact that during the deliberations the jury sent a 
note to the judge requesting identification of the exhibit numbers which related 
to the Beatrice Foods tickets and damages. Judge Hall communicated to the jury 
that in fact those tickets had never been introduced as exhibits. 
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Evidence of Calculation of Damages 
Evidence presented relating to defendant's damages as set forth in his Co 
claim is as follows: 
COUNT I. "Cow Deaths." Defendant testified that 42 of his cows died 
as a result of the consumption by those cows of feed negligently manufactured by 
plaintiff, at a loss of $33 ,600. 00. (Tr. 1042-1048; Ab. 145-147) Defendant deriv~ 
this figure by searching his memory and tax records which never were introduced 
into evidence. (Tr. 1042-1049, 1149; Ab. 145-187) Thereafter, defendant admitt 
that he did not have any records which would show the cause of death for the cows 
he is claiming damages for. (Tr. 1122-1131; Ab . 180 , 181) The DHIA records, 
as admitted into evidence, indicate that twenty-two of defendant's cows died during 
the periods of time in question. (Tr. 333; Ab. 22) The DHIA records do not 
reflect the cause of death. Mr. Withers did, however, testify that under various 
circumstances a cow could come into a herd and die prior to being included on 
the DHIA records. (Tr. 356-361; Ab. 25-26) Defendant's hired milkers testified 
as to even fewer cows that died of bloat. Mr. Aragon who worked for the defen-
dant from May 1971 to July 1972 (Tr. 583; Ab. 63) and again from April 1973 to 
October 20, 1973 (Tr. 594; Ab. 69) testified that he remembered three cows 
having died from bloat during a bad onset of bloat, when 7 or 8 cows had bloated; 
this was between May 1971 and July 1972 at American Fork. (Tr. 610; Ab. 72) 
Another milker, Dallas Schrimer, who worked for the defendant from September 
1972 to August 1974 and from April 1975 to the present (Tr. 641; Ab. 81) testified 
only as to two cows which died of bloat during his employ at defendant's dairy· 
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(Tr. 661-663; Ab. 86) Likewise, Harvey Cook, who milked defendant's cows from 
January 1, 1974, to the present (Tr. 679; Ab. 89) testified as having seen only 
two cows in defendant's dairy herd die of bloat. (Tr. 680; Ab. 90) 
COUNT II. "Cows Sold for Beef because of Non-Productivity." The 
defendant testified that it was necessary for him to "cull" 136 cows at a loss of 
$63, 400. 00 because such cows were no longer productive. Approximately one-
half of the 136 cows sold for beef were so sold because they could not get pregnant. 
The remaining cows were sold due to "stress" and ''bloat." (Tr. 1076-1080; Ab. 
155-156; Tr. 1133-1142; Ab. 182-183; Tr. 1158-1167; Ab. 188-192) Defendant 
expressly testified that the information which he compiled on proposed Exhibit 
146, was taken from the DHIA records (Tr. 1133; Ab. 182) which indicated the cow 
number, production level, and percentage of the herd. Defendant also stated that 
he had no records which show why any particular cow was culled during the time 
periods he used plaintiff's feed. (Tr. 1140; Ab. 183) Thereafter defendant testified 
that in listing the cows he sold for beef, he reviewed the DHIA records, his memory, 
and "other sources which (he) deems to be reliable." (Tr. 1158; Ab. 188) The 
DHIA records for the periods of time in question indicate that a total of only 87 
cows were sold for beef. (Tr. 334; Ab. 22) 
COUNT III. "60 Retarded Cows." Defendant testified that he incurred 
damages of $98, 600. 00 due to the additional costs required to maintain his cows 
beyond the normal lactation period. ln determining his measure of damages, 
defendant multiplied the number of days beyond 305 days each cow was in lactation, 
by $4.00 per day for the first period of his feeding plaintiff's feed and $5.10 per 
-25-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
, 
day for the second period of his feeding plaintiff's feed. Defendant stated that 
the daily values represented his cost of labor, feed, housing, utilities, etc. (Tr, . 
1065-1069; Ab. 152-153; Tr. 1074-1076; Ab. 154-155; Tr. 1157-1158; Ab. 188) 
Mr. Gerald Withers, defendant's witness, testified that a lactation period is based 
on 305 days, although, it is not unusual for a cow to milk more or less than 305 
days. (Tr. 302; Ab. 17) Defendant, however, claiming that his cows could not 
get pregnant because of plaintiff's feed, computed his damages on a per day main1 
ance charge for each day in lactation over 305 days. In addition, defendant's wiln 
Dr. Gardner, testified that there is conflict of opinion among leading authorities 
on the subject as to whether urea (NPN) has any relationship whatsoever to the 
reproductive process, calving, retained placentas and natural abortions. (Tr. 
735; Ab. 104-105) 
COUNT IV. "Stomach Upset and Stress Resulting in a Decline in Milli 
Production." Defendant claims that as a result of feeding plaintiff's grain to his 
dairy herd, the cows suffered stomach upset and stress, causing a d~cline in 
milk production and damages in the amount of $124,053.00. There was testimony 
by expert witnesses Gardner (Tr. 714-715; Ab. 100) and Huber (Tr. 862; Ab. 
198) that under test conditions if a cow consumed . 4 pounds of urea per day, such 
amount of-urea would be sufficient to cause a decline in milk production. Both 
Drs. Gardner and Huber testified that none of the State Chemist reports on 14% 
dairy feed contained a sufficient amount of urea to cause the problems in declining 
milk production defendant complained of. (Tr. 795; Ab. 121; Tr. 877; Ab. 202) 
Defendant states that he used a chart (Exhibit 136) and the DHIA records to determ· 
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his milk production losses per month and then he multipled the total number of 
pounds of milk lost per month by invoice figures, such as the Beatrice Foods-Meadow 
Gold Dairy receipt, which he claims he maintained for his tax records, to determine 
the value of his claimed loss of milk production. The tax receipts and invoice-receipts 
were never introduced into evidence. In addition, the poundage figures as to defendant's 
claimed loss of milk production are unsupported. 
COUNT V. "Increased Costs to Maintain Production Level." Defendant 
testified that he incurred additional expenses as a result of the consumption of 
plaintiff's feed in the amount of $20 ,000 .00. He testified that his c).ajmed damages 
included the increased costs of milking three times a day, extra labor costs, the 
cost of extra utility use, such as gas and electricity , the costs of additional wear 
and tear on machinery, the cost of bloat guard, and the cost of artificial insemin-
ation. (Tr. 1061-1062; Ab. 151; Tr. 1109-1110; Ab. 163-164; Tr. 1168-1169; Ab. 
192-193) No receipts, invoices, cancelled checks, business records, utility bills, 
etc. were introduced into evidence to support his claim for $20 ,000 .00 in increased 
costs and expenses incurred as a result of feeding plaintifrs grain. A large part 
of defendant's claimed damages with respect to converting to three-times milking 
was based upon percentages in an article he had read in a Dairy Herd Management 
magazine. (Tr. 1062; Ab. 151) The Dairy Herd Management magazine article 
which defendant relied upon was not offered into evidence. 
COUNT VI. "Cows Ate More Grain." Defendant claims that his dairy 
herd consumed a greater volume of feed to compensate for the protein deficiency 
of plaintiff, resulting in $64 ,000 .00 of damages. Defendant testified that he was 
feeding his cows additional grain in an attempt to increase their production, but 
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that because the cows were sick, they could not utilize the grain they ate and th~ 
milk production was lower. (Tr. 1103; Ab. 162) In calculating his damages,d• 
testified that the United States Department of Agriculture publishes a ratio of the 
pounds of milk produced per pounds of grain consumed. During the periods of 
time in question, one pound of grain was necessary for a cow to produce three 
pounds of milk according to the ratio published by the U. S . Department of Agri-
culture. No evidence of such published ratio was offered at trial. Defendant 
determined that, on the average, each cow in his herd consumed 26 pounds of 
grain per day by averaging the number of pounds of grain he ordered from plain· 
and dividing that amount by the number of cow days. (Tr. 1111; Ab. 164) Defen· 
dant admitted that the 26 pounds of grain consumed per cow "on the average" w~ 
calculated only with respect to a three month period during which defendantpur· 
280 tons of grain, not with respect to the total time that he was purchasing plaintiff 
feed. The consumption of grain by dry cows , calves and springing heifers is not 
included in the calculation of the 26 pound average figure. Defendant admits 
the average would be lower if such grain consuming cows were included in his 
computations. (Tr. 1152; Ab. 186) Futher it must be noted that there is controv 
as to how many pounds of grain defendant's cows consumed daily. The consumptii 
of grain varied anywhere from 5 to 32 pounds of grain per cow per day. (Tr. 
1152; Ab. 186) Defendant determined the amount of grain per day necessary to 
support his actual milk production using the 26 pounds figure (Tr. 1111; Ab. !6ll 
and computed his damages therefrom . 
COUNT VII. "Overpayment to Plaintiff due to Protein Deficiency in 
Feed." Defendant claims $57 ,420 .00 in damages due to an overpayment for feed 
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l 
deficient in crude protein. In calculating his damages, defendant averaged the 
crude protein content reflected on the State Chemist reports on 32% cattle supple-
ment and 32% concentrate from 19 70-1975. Upon determining a percentage deficiency 
in protein, defendant multiplied that figure by the cost of protein per ton, and 
then arrived at a figure which he considers to be an overpayment to IFA because 
of a protein deficiency. (Tr. 1093-1102; Ab. 160-162) Thereafter, defendant 
admitted that in averaging the claimed deficiency in crude protein he did not offset 
excesses of protein against deficiencies nor did he average out the protein content 
of 14% dairy feed, during the time period in question, which is the type of feed 
purchased by defendant. (Tr. 1152; Ab. 186) 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY AND RECEIPT OF EVIDENCE 
RELATING SOLELY TO THE ISSUE OF ALLEGED PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES RESULTED IN CONFUSION TO THE JtJRY 
AND PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
Evidence which admittedly could not be used to show contamination of the feed 
purchased by defendant Fitzgerald bearing upon the seven substantive Counts of 
the Counterclaim was admitted time and time again over objection of counsel. On 
several occasions, counsel for defendant Fitzgerald stressed in front of the jury 
the relevance of such evidence as bearing solely upon the issue of punitive damages 
in connection with notice and knowledge. (Tr. 502; Ab. 57: Tr. 817; Ab. 126) 
The court apparently acquiesced in the limitations asserted by counsel for Fitzgerald, 
but in many instances that was not clear and many of the exhibits in dispute were 
admitted into evidence generally. (See Tr. 270: Ab. 12; Tr. 710, 711: Ab. 99.) 
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The adverse cumulative effect of such evidence undoubtedly was very damaging. 
The jury refused to return a verdict on punitive damages , but assessed enormoU! 
general damages. The admission of particular exhibits months before and montJu 
the relevant time period, and concerning feed sold at other places, undoubtedly 
contributed to the large jury award. Examples of "tainted" exhibits which well 
could have unduly influenced the jury, all well beyond the time period and cone· 
relevant, if at all, only to punitive damages, are Exhibits 12-D, 13-D, 15-D, and 
149-D. One of the test reports within Exhibit 149-D on a small sample of 32% Daiey 
Concentrate pellets taken at St. George on May 4, 1970, reads that: "This label 
is false and misleading." It was never made clear to the jury as to that sample, 
or any of the aforesaid exhibits, that such could not be considered in mBking de! 
ations of negligence, proximate cause, or assessment of damages other than puni · 
(See pp. 9-12 of this Brief, supra.) 
The court recognized at the conclusion of the trial upon submission of the 
case to the jury that some of the exhibits could be confusing to the jury. In this 
regard, Judge Hall acknowledged that the jury ought not to be allowed to specuhi 
or give weight to certain exhibits on the issues of excess urea, inconsistent pro-
tein, deficiency in crude protein , negligence or otherwise than specifically as 
related to the question of notice and punitive damages , and gave the following 
instruction: 
You are instructed that certain exhibits hereinafter 
enumerated have been offered and admitted iiito evidence by 
the court as bearing' Upon the question ofnotfoe to the plaintiff 
of a deficiency in its feed. You are instructed that said exhibits 
should not be considered for any other purpose or as bearing 
upon any other issue and do not constitute proof of any other 
claim made by the counterclaimant in this case. (Instruction 
No. 20) [Emphasis added.] 
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r 
The court failed thereafter to enumerate the exhibits so restricted. (See pp. 11-
12 of this Brief, supra ) 
The aforesaid instruction could only have contributed more to the confusion 
of the jury. It was an insufficient curative instruction and could not have helped 
the jury to identify which exhibits they were being told not to consider as proof 
of other than punitive damages . 
A. The Admission of Exhibits Remote in Time and Place was 
Error Because of the Risk of Confusion 
In Rule 6 of our Rules of Evidence, it is recognized that evidence may be 
admitted for one purpose only , but that the court has a duty to restrict such evidence 
to its proper scope and to instruct the jury accordingly. In this ~ed, it ts Bornbook 
law that evidence incompetent for one purpose may be proper for another purpose. 
(19 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, § 262) However, since the jury may erroneously use 
evidence proper for only a restricted purpose for other purposes, it is error to 
receive such in the first place if the risk of confusion is so great "as to upset the 
balance of advantage of receiving it." (Id.) This proposition, th4t initial receipt 
of such evidence may constitute error as a matter of law where the circumstances 
of confusion are probable, has been recognized by many courts, including the 
Supreme Court of the United States. Thus, in Waldron v. Waldron, 156 US 311 
(1894), the Court stated: 
There is an exception, however, to this general rule, 
by virtue of which the curative effect of the correction, in 
any particular instance, depends upon whether or not, 
considering the whole case in its particular circumstances, 
the error committed appears to have been of so serious a 
nature that it must have affected the minds of the jury 
despite the correction by the Court. (Id. at 383) [Emphasis 
added.] 
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Accord, Shepard v. USA, 290 US 96 (1933) , where in a criminal case, but With 
equal applicability to civil cases, the Court said: 
It is for ordinary minds, and not for psychoanalysts, 
that our rules of evidence are framed. . . . When the risk 
of confusion is so great as to upset the balance of advantage, 
the evidence goes out. Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Ev. 
266, 516: Wignore, Ev. Sections 1421, 1422, 1714. (290 US at 
104) [Emphasis added.] 
B. Failure to Instruct with Clarity as to the Restricted Use Constituted 
Prejudicial Error 
This Court has long recognized the danger inherent in receipt of evidence 
which was admissible only for a special purpose, and early adopted the univer-
sally followed rule: 
· When evidence is introduced which is not admissible 
except for a special purpose, the jury should be instructed 
upon the request of the party prejudiced thereby, to limit its 
use to that purpose only; and a refusal to so instruct upon 
request is reversible error, when the evidence, if not explained, 
is such as might be misapplied so as to exercise an improper 
influence upon the jury in respect to the main issue to the 
injury of the party against whom the evidence was adduced. 
Neilson v. Nebo Brown Stone Co., 25 Utah 37, 69 Pac. 289 
(1902). 
This is a well settled rule in both civil and criminal cases. Where, as in this 
case, objection was made to receipt of the challenged exhibits, the court has a 
duty to issue proper instructions limiting the use of the evidence in question to 
proper issues: 
Evidence which is incompetent as to one issue, but admis-
sible as to another, cannot properly be considered for its bearing 
on the former issue. Such evidence should be offered by a party 
and received by the court ONLY for the specific purpose for which 
it is competent. The court should limit its application by proper 
instructions at least where requested to do so or when objection 
is made to the introduction of evidence. 29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, 
§ 263 at 311. [Emphasis added.] 
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But the damning effect of the situation in the case at bar is even worse and 
stronger than in the cited authorities . Here, the court recognized the necessity 
for a curative instruction, and undertook to set forth an admonition to the jury in 
order to guide it in Instruction 20 and to require exclusion of "certain exhibits" 
from consideration "for any other purpose" than the question of notice per the 
punitive damage issue. But this Instruction did not help . It further confused. 
What exhibits were so excluded? Even if the jury could recall the maze of testimony 
over the nine day trial, the circumstances as to how the prejudicial exhibits were 
received into evidence, after objection, only would have added to the confusion. 3> 
3) Previous admission of remote exhibits into evidence, often withaut admonition 
at the time of receipt into evidence as to the purpose received, had to be confus-
ing. For instance, some of the most objectionable exhibits were introduced, objected 
to, and received generally. (See Exhibits 4-D, 5-D, 11-D, 12-D .) Others were 
introduced, objected to, ruling reserved and later admitted into evidence generally. 
[Exhibits 13-D, 14-D, 15-D, 16-D, 89-D, 90-D, .92-D, 94-D, 95-D, 99-D, 100-D, 
104-D, 110-D, 111-D, 112-D, 113-D, 114-D, 115-D, 125-D, 126-D, 127-D, 128-D 
(test numbers 6263 and 4090), 129-D (test numbers 9066·, 2779, 2746, 4804) and 
130-D (test numbers 3333,5204, 5624, 5722, 6722, 9061, 75-2833 and 75-3670).) 
In other instances, objectionable exhibits bearing conceivably only upon puni-
tive damages were introduced, objected to, ruling reserved, admitted into evidence, 
and later in discussion or in connection with testimony of some other witness, 
restricted to the issue of notice or knowledge. The court ultimately sustained objection 
as to general use of Exhibit 12-D. (Tr. 710, 711; Ab. 99) A similar restriction 
1
, :
1
! 
was also placed on Exlu'bit 15. (Tr. 704, 711; Ab. 98, 99) In discussions before 
the jury during the offering of remote exhibits, after objection by counsel for plaintiff, 
defendant's counsel expressly stated that such exhibits were offered for the sole 
purpose of showing notice or knowledge as it relates to the punitive element of 
defendant's claim. [See Exhibits 2 through 16 at Tr. 271; Ab. 12; Exhibits 89 
through 130 at Tr. 502, 504; Ab. 57; and Exhibit 149-D at Tr. 817; Ab. 126] 
(See pp. 6-12 of this Brief, supra.) 
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POINT II. 
INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY ON THE ISSUE OF 
NEGLIGENCE CONSTITUTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
This case was pleaded and evidence presented solely on the theory of aI!eg~ 
negligence. The Amended Counterclaim set forth seven counts of negligence, eact 
claiming damages "as a direct, legal and proximate result" of "feed negligently 
produced." Count VIII also repeated the allegations of negligence, but was for 
punitive damages because of alleged "willful and intentional" conduct of selling 
feed after being informed that the label was "false and misleading." At the conclu· 
sion of the case in chief, in argument in response to Motion for Directed Verdict, 
counsel for defendant made it abundantly clear that the sole theory of recovery 
was negligence, and that the relevant considerations were (1) negligence, (2) 
causation, and (3) damages. (Tr. 840-851; Ab. 173-178) However, in submissioo 
of the case to the jury, in the Special Interrogatories and the Special Verdict and 
in instructions , there was an apparent switch in that the jury was asked to deter· 
mine (as the sole basis for any possible liability) whether the feed delivered by 
plaintiff "contained levels of urea and protein inconsistent with its guarantee." 
(R. 140) Then, as though the case were based upon warranty or some theory 
of absolute liability, the court instructed that if the jury were to determine from 
a preponderance of the evidence (keep in mind that there was no direct evidence 
and that such preponderance had to be based upon an inference both as to negli· 
gence and causation from the circumstances - see Point III. A, at pp.39-40 of this 
Brief, infra) that the feed in question was manufactured in violation of the statute, 
there was negligence per seas a matter of law. (See the Court's Instructions 
16 and 17 at pp. 12-13, of this Brief, supra.) 
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A. Submission of the Case to the Jury on the Theory of Guarantee 
Was Confusing and Constituted Error 
This court has recognized the applicable general rule that submission of 
the case to the jury must be confined to the issues pleaded and the evidence 
presented: 
Instructions should be confined to the issues presented 
by the pleadings and the evidence. It is improper to give an 
instruction announcing a naked legal proposition, however 
correct it may be, unless it bears upon and is connected with 
the issues involved; and unless , further, there has been received 
some competent evidence to which the jury may apply it. Such 
an instruction tends to distract the minds of the jury from the 
real question submitted to them for determination. . . . 
In determining the scope of its instructions, the court 
must keep in mind the issues made by the pleadings in the 
cause; and the general rule is that all instructions must be 
confined to those issues , and the evidence in support thereof, 
and that no instruction should be given which tenders an issue 
that is not supported by the pleadings or which deviates there-
from in any material respect. Davis v. Midvale City, 56 Utah 
1, 189 Pac. 74 (1920). 
Plainly, the guarantee and strict liability theories set forthin the Instructions and 
Special Interrogatories were not the theories on which defendant pleaded his cause 
of action or presented evidence. 
B. Violation of Statute does not Necessarily Constitute Negligence 
Per Se and May be Considered Only as Evidence of Negligence 
As Instructions 16 and 17 were given, the question of negligence was vir-
tually taken away from consideration by the jury, and it was instructed as a matter 
of law to find negligence to exist if they were to determine that the statutes in 
question were violated in any particular. This court has limited the effect of statutory 
violation in negligence cases to very narrow circumstances, and has stressed that 
while violation of a statute may be prima facie evidence of negligence, such does 
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not constitute negligence as a matter of law. Determination of negligence is a 
question of fact, not law. In Thompson v. Ford Motor Co. , 16 Utah 2d 30, 39~ 
P . 2d 62 (1964) , this court noted that violation of a safety standard set by statute 
or ordinance may be regarded as prima facie evidence of negligence , but is 
subject to justification or excuse if the evidence is such that it reasonab_!r 
could be found that the conduct was nevertheless within the standard of care 
the circumstances. In an early case, the Supreme Court of Utah noted that when 
a statute is violated the effect thereof in terms of negligence presents a question 
of fact: 
Whether to do so (violate a statute) constitutes negligence 
is dependent upon the facts and circumstances of the case and 
generally, is a question of fact, not law. White v. Shipley, 
48 Utah 496, 160 Pac 441 (1916) at 444. [Emphasis added.] 
To the same effect is Klafta v. Smith, 17 Utah 2d 65, 404 P .2d 659 (1965). In thi 
case, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the lower court's ruling that the defendli 
was liable as a matter of law for the violation of a statute which required loaded 
vehicles to be securely fastened so that the cargo would not fall on the highway. 
In Klafta, this Court expressly held that the alleged violation of that statute 
did not constitute liability as a matter of law, and reiterated the principle that 
violation of a statute is at most prima facie evidence of negligence subject tojus' 
tion or excuse. 
The farreaching and prejudicial effect of Instructions 16 and 17 (as to whid 
strenuous exception was taken) cannot be overestimated. To begin with, in 
order to find violation of the statutes relating to misbranding, the jury would haVI 
had to infer from questionable (incompetent?) circumstantial evidence that the 
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feed actually delivered or sold to Fitzgerald was contaminated, by reason oflligred-
ients presumably mixed after shipment from a branch of plaintiff other than Spanish 
Fork. There is serious question as to the legal sufficiency of such evidence as 
a matter of law in any event. (See pp. 40 of this Brief, infra.) But arguendo, 
if it was proper to permit the jury to infer or speculate as to the toxicity of the 
specific or actual feed which was eaten by Mr. Fitzgerald's cows, was it proper 
to ~the jury to find negligence to exist as a matter of law if there was a violation 
of the statute in any particular at any time relating to the feed in question or any 
component ingredient thereof? Jury Instructions Nos. 16 and 17 effeetively took 
consideration as to the standard of care away from the jury and set Ult the statutes 
as the sole measure of the standard of care and of negligence. Ol!ller''than pessible 
violation of the statutes , 4> many other considerations were before tbe jury whieh 
could have preponderated against a determination of negligence if the jury had 
been allowed to weigh and consider all relevant evidence. 5> 
4) Note that there was never presented any direct evidence that the statutes were 
ever violated during the time periods in question. The jury would have had to 
infer violation. Several exhibits which were remote in time (such ae exln'bits 
12-D, 13-D, 15-D and 149-D) were the most likely source of such an inference. 
But those exhibits were (or should have been) confined to punitive damages. By 
Instructions 16 and 17 the Court invited the jury to look at ~ admitted evidence 
(including evidence which had been limited solely to punitive damages) in deter-
mining the possible violation of the statutes. Such <n'lStituted prejudicial error 
in that the jury was directed to look at "tainted" exhibits admittedly not bearing 
upon the issue of negligence. 
5) The jury had before it much evidence from which a determination against the 
existence of negligence, based upon a preponderance thereof, could have been 
made if the issue of negligence hadn't been removed as a matter of law. For 
instance, the jury should have been allowed to weigh and consider the following 
matters in determining whether IFA's acts and conduct fell below the proper 
standard of care: 
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It is submitted that Instructions 16 and 17 invaded the province of the jury 
and in effect erroneously misconceived the case as one of warranty or absolute 
liability for statutory violations . 
. Of the 77 State Chemist Reports admitted into evidence, 35 were 
of feed samples taken during the relevant time periods , and only two indi· 
cated a presence of excess urea (NPN) . (Six test reports indicated an e 
of urea (NPN) in the 42 samples before and after the relevant time periods.] 
Accordingly, there was much more affirmative evidence of properly manu-
factured feed than of possible contamination. (See also footnotes 1and2 
at pp. 5-6 of this Brief; supra . ) 
. Blair Thomas testified that he purchased 14% dairy feed from 
plaintiff's Spanish Fork branch during the same time periods that defen-
dant was using IFA feed, without any of the symptoms complained of by 
defendant appearing in his dairy herd. (Tr. 920-922; Ab. 214-215) 
. Ferris Fitzgerald testified that he fed each of his cows approxi-
mately . 7 pounds of urea per day, without any of the symptoms complained 
of by defendant. (Tr. 778, 796; Ab. 117, 121) Defendant's cows would 
not have consumed that much urea per day even if they ate only the feed 
reflected on the State Chemist Reports showing the greatest urea concentr · 
. Exhibits 58-P - 63-P indicate that during the time period that del 
was feeding his cows plaintiff's feed, the yearly milk production of his dail! 
herd increased from 12,584 pounds of milk per cow (372 pounds of milk pa 
cow less than the Salt Lake County average) to 14, 675 pounds of milk per 
cow (1,688 pounds of milk per coW' ~than the Salt Lake County 
average). 
-38-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT III. 
EVIDENCE OFFERED AND RECEIVED WAS INSUFFICIENT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW TO PROVE THAT PLAINTIFF'S 
NEGLIGENCE PROXIMATELY CAUSED DEFENDANT-
COUNTERCLAIMANT'S DAMAGES 
Defendant had the burden to show from a preponderance of evidence (1) that 
plaintiff manufactured and sold to defendant feed which was harmful and defective, 
in that it contained an excess of urea, a deficiency in crude protein, or inconsistent 
protein levels contrary to the general duty owed by plaintiff to all dairymen who 
purchased its feed, to sell feed which would not harm dairy animals; (2) that there 
was a causal connection between the alleged harmful feed and the deaths, sickness 
and loss of production among defendant's dairy herd; and (3) that defendant 
suffered damages as a result of feeding his cows such harmful and defective feed, 
and the amount of such damages. Each of the foregoing elements must be established 
by prima facie evidence before the case could be submitted for jury consideration. 
But defendant's case was built entirely upon circumstantial evidence in order to 
create inferences. Circumstantial evidence presented was relied upon not only 
to create the inference of negligence but also to create the inference of causation. 
It is submitted that as to each element there was an insufficiency of proof as 
a matter of law . 
A. Plaintiff's Motion for Directed Verdict Should Have Been Granted as a 
Matter of Law 
At the conclusion of defendant's evidence on the Counterclaim, plaintiff moved 
for a directed verdict. (Tr. 829; Ab. 165) This matter was extensively argued. 
(Tr. 829-850; Ab . 165-178) It is subnrltted that at the time this motion was filed , 
the evidence before the jury of negligence, proximate cause and damages was 
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clearly insufficient as a matter of law. The trial court was inclined to grant themQ 
and commented as to the non-existence of clinical tests relating to the feed in ques-
tion. (Tr. 840, 850; Ab. 78) The matter was thereafter argued upon the basis of 
two Utah cases thought by the court to be controlling and the motion was denied. 
The cases in question were Farmers Grain Coop. v. Fredrickson, 7 Utah 2d 180, 
321 P .2d 926 (1958) and Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co., 121 Utah 339, 241P.2d914 
(1952). It is submitted that the court misapplied those cases to the facts of this 
case, and erred in failing to distinguish those cases and regarding them as con-
trolling. Those cases , and other relevant authorities , are discussed in detail in 
connection with Point III. D of this Brief concerning insufficiency of evidence as 
relating to proximate cause. 
As to law supporting the proposition that the motion for directed verdict 
should have been granted, this Court has recqplized that a directed verdict is p 
where the proof fails to disclose any controversy as to controlling facts or where 
is a lack of proof supporting one or more of the material elements of the cause o! 
action asserted. Flynn v. W. P. Harlin Construction Co., 29 Utah 2d 317, 509 
p .2d 356 (1973). 
B. Insufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence to Create Inference ofNegligen 
It is submitted that the evidence presented as to the non-punitive counts 
bearing upon negligence was insufficient as a matter of law to create the inferen~ 
of negligence. 6) Arguendo, however, that the jury could have inferred negligeni 
6) Defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of negligence with respect to 
plaintiff's breach of duty in the following particulars: 
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1. No direct evidence was introduced to show that the IFA 14% dairy feed 
consumed by defendant's cows, contained an excess of urea (NPN), a deficiency 
of protein or an inconsistency in the amounts of protein. In fact both expert wit-
nesses Drs. Gardner and Huber stated that none of the feed analyzed in the State 
Chemist Reports on 14% dairy feed during the time periods in question would cause 
the type of problems complainedofby defendant. (Tr. 795; Ab. 121; Tr. 877; 
Ab. 202) 
2. If the State Chemist Reports prior and subsequent to the pertinent time 
periods in question were admitted solely for the purpose of notice as related to 
Count VIII on punitive damages, such reports could not have been considered for 
establishing a prima facie case of negligence as to Counts I through VII. Such 
remote exhibits cannot be used to infer that the feed that defendant's cows ate 
was necessarily defective, harmful, or substandard merely because, at various 
points in time before and after defendant used plaintiff's feed, the State Chemical 
Reports indicated that there were feed samples taken from branch offices of IFA 
other than Spanish Fork which differed from the contents of the feed as set forth 
on the label and that plaintiff had notice thereof. 
3. Disregarding all remote State Chemist Reports, only two such reports 
(Exhibits 116-D and 130-D, test number 9870), show excessive amounts of urea 
(NPN) sufficient to cause the problems complained of only if certain assumptions 
are made relative to the weight of the cow, the amount of grain consumed, the 
lack of intake of other food matter, the absence of an acclimation period, the use 
of 350 pounds of the 32% supplement per ton of 14% dairy feed, and the absence 
of such factors as seasonal changes , disease among the herd , hoof trimming, and 
a variety of other possible causes of the problems complained of by defendant. 
(Tr. 707, 736, 751, 902; Ab. 98-105, 110, 209) Furthermore, those two State Chemist 
Reports cover only a very limited time period, in comparison to the nearly th;ree --
year period during which defendant fed IFA feed to his cows. Exhibit 130-D (test 
number 9870) is a sample of 32% dairy concentrate taken at the St. George branch 
of IFA a few days after defendant began using plaintiff's feed and Exhibit 116-D 
is a sample of 32% cattle supplement taken at the Draper branch of IFA one day 
before defendant quit feeding IFA feed. There is no evidence that this 32% ingredient 
was mixed with 14% dairy feed that defendant's cows ate, and that even if it was 
mixed into 14% dairy feed, there is no evidence that such 32% supplement was so 
mixed into the feed defendant purchased throughout the entire period of time in 
question. In addition, there is testimony that an excess in urea (NPN) in the sup-
plement does not necessarily follow through into the 14% dairy feed when mixed. 
(See Tr. 797-798; Ab. 122 and see Exhibits 99-D and 100-D, 101-D and 103-D, 
and 112-D and 124-D .) 
4. Defendant asserted that the test reports from the State Chemist's Office 
plainly show that IFA was negligent, that IFA breached its statutory duty under 
the Commercial Feed Laws, and therefore breached its duty owed to defendant, 
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from all of the evidence (as distiguished from being directed to find negligence 
as a matter of law - see Point II. of this Brief, supra), it is submitted that the ju~ 
could not legally infer from that same evidence the existence of proximate cause. 
In substance and effect, this amounts to bulding an inference upon an inference. 
C. Inference Based Upon Inference 
An inference which is based solely and entirely upon another inference ana 
which is unsupported by any additional fact or any other inference from other faa; 
is an inference upon an inference and is universally condemned. Generally, whi 
is meant by the rule forbidding the basing of one inference upon another is that~ 
inference cannot be based upon evidence which is too uncertain or speculative or 
which raises merely a conjecture or possibility. 
The Utah Supreme Court recognized the basic principle that an inference 
cannot be based upon an inference as early as 1916 in Denver & R .G .R. Co. v. 
Ashton-Whyte-Skillicorn Co., 49 Utah 82, 162 Pac. 83 (1916), wherein this Court 
held: 
As the record now stands, however, the presumption of defen-
dant's negligence must be based upon another presumption, namely 
that the cars were in the actual control and management of the 
defendant when they escaped. This would result in basing one 
presumption upon another which would be violation of an elementary 
rule of evidence. Id . at 85 . 
The rule is well stated in Splinter v. City of Nampa, 74 Idaho 1, 10, 256 P .2d 
215' 220 (1953): 
as anindividualpurchaserofitsfeed. (Tr. 843-846; Ab. 173-175) The State 
Chemist Reports outside of the pertinent time periods were introduced solely '.01 
purpose of notice; if such notice was in fact established , such notice, alone• is 
insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish a probability of negligence with resp 
to the manufacturing of the feed that defendant purchased. 
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Circumstantial evidence is competent to establish negligence 
and proximate cause. Facts, which are essential to a liability for 
negligence, may be inferred upon circumstances which are estab-
lished by evidence. But, where circumstantial evidence is relied 
upon, the circumstances must be proved, and not themselves be 
left to presumption or inference. (Citations.) This court has 
held that inference cannot be based upon inference, nor presump-
tion on presumption. (Citations . ) 
The underlying principle applicable here is that a verdict 
cannot rest on conjecture; that where a party seeks to establish 
a liability by circumstantial evidence, he must establish circum-
stances of such nature and so related to each other that his theory 
of liability is the more reasonable conclusion to be drawn there-
from, and that where the proven facts are equally consistent with 
the absence, as with the existence, of negligence on the part of 
defendant, the plaintiff has not carried the burden of proof and 
cannot recover. (Citations.) [Emphasis added.] 
See also: Annot., 95 A .L .R. 162, 181-192 (1935); Wigmore on 
Evidence, Third Ed. Vol. IX, at 299 (1940). 
The following principles are pertinent in applying the prohibition of inference upon 
inference in this case: 
Inference Must be Reasonably Certain and Probable-
A presumption of fact or inference cannot be raised f~m some proven fact 
unless a rational connection exists between such fact and the ultimate fact presumed. 
A fact can be regarded as the basis of an inference only where the inference logically 
flows from the fact. An inference must reasonably be drawn from and supported by 
the facts on which it purports to rest, and must be made in accordance with correct 
and common modes of reasoning. Holland v. Columbia Iron Mining Co. , 4 Utah 2d 
303, 193P.2d 700 (1956). ~·Schmidt v. Pioneer United Dairy, 60Wash 
2d271, 373P.2d 764 (1962); Downs v. Longfellow Corp., 351P.2d 999 (Okla. 
1960). 
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Premises for Inference Must be Based upon Fact 
A presumption or inference of fact must not be drawn from premises Whi~ 
are uncertain, but must be founded on facts established by direct evidence. 
In this respect, this Court recently held in Lindsay v. Gibbons and Reed, 27 u 
2d 419, 497 P .2d 28 (1972) that: 
(A) f"mding of causation cannot be predicated on mere 
speculation or conjecture, and the matter must be withdrawn 
from the jury's consideration, unless there is evidence from 
which the inference may reasonably be drawn that the injury 
suffered was caused by the negligent act of the defendant. 
[Milligan v. Capitol Furniture Co. , 8 Utah 2d 383, 387, 335 
P .2d 619 (1959).] Jurors may not speculate as to possibilities; 
they may, however, make justifiable inferences from circumstantial 
evidence to find negligence or proximate cause. In such instances, 
circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish a prima facie 
case of negligence, if men of reasonable minds may conclude 
that there is a greater probability that the conduct relied upon 
was the proximate cause than there is that it was not. [Alvarado 
v. Tucker, 2Utah2d 16, 19, 268P.2d968 (1954).] 
In the instant action, there was a mere choice of prob-
abilities as to why Mr. Lewis was in the wrong lane of traffic, 
and there was no basis in the evidence upon which the jury could 
believe that there was a greater probability he was misled into 
the opposing lane rather than for some other reason. 497 P .2d at 
31. [Emphasis added.] 
Inference Cannot be Inconsistent with Direct and Uncontroverted Contr 
Evidence 
A fact cannot be established by circumstances which are perfectly consisl 
with direct, uncontradicted and unimpeached testimony that the fact does note" 
Bulatao v. Kauai Motors, Ltd., 49 Haw. 1, "406 P. 2d 887 (1965). 
Circumstances Must be More than Merely Consistent 
A fact is not proven by circumstances which are merely consistent with i~ 
existence. Arterburn v. St. Joseph's Hospital and Rehabilitation Center, 55! 
P.2d 886 (Kan. 1976); Bottjer v. Hammond, 200 Kan. 327, 436 P.2d 882 (1968). 
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D. Insufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence to Create Inference of 
Proximate Cause 
In this case, it was essential for the defendant to rule out other possible 
causes of the damages before the jury should be allowed to infer (speculate?) 
that the feed (which the jury had already been instructed was negligently manu-
factured, was toxic or would cause a decline in milk production if the jury should 
find or infer violation of statutes in any particular) was the cause of the damage. 
There had to be ruled out other possible causes, such as: weather; contamination 
of other feed and food being eaten by the animals; ineffective and inefficient milking 
techniques and milkers; inconsistent feeding and milking procedures; communi-
cable disease among the herd; changing locations of the herd; and general poor 
health among the herd. (See pp. 13-16 of this Brief, supra.) There was absolutely 
no evidence presented to negate weather conditions, milking procedures, hoof 
trimming, or sickness and disease among the herd as causes of the damage. As 
a matter of fact, in apparent substitution for competent ·evidence, counsel for 
defendant only proferred hypothetical questions and assumptions set forth in those 
questions as the basis for supposedly negating hoof trimming, milking techniques 
and procedures , weather conditions and seasonal changes, and sickness. The 
only "evidence," which surely was~ competent evidence, as to those matters 
is fully set forth at pp. 16-20 of this Brief, supra. 
Furthermore, there was no certain evidence that, even if plaintiff's feed was 
somehow determined to be defective, the consumption of that feed would cause 
the problems complained of, unless the jury was further to assume that the cows 
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each weighed 1300 pounds, each ate 32 pounds of grain per day, that the cows 
ate nothing else, and that all of the 14% dairy feed that they consumed during the 
entire time period in question was manufactured using 350 pounds of that specifii 
32% supplement reflected on Exhibits 116-D or 130-D (test number 9870). (Tr. 
707, 736, 751, 901; Ab. 98, 105, 110, 209) [Those were the only test reports 
from which the jury could have inferred that toxic components were mi:ll!d into 
the actual feed purchased.] Moreover, even if the jury did make the above as 
it would then have had to assume that the weather conditions were normal, that 
there was no sickness among the herd, that the cows never had their hooves t · 
too closely, that the cows did not eat anything other than the 14% dairy feed, and 
that all feedings and milkings were uniformly conducted each day over the enti11 
period of time in question by the same milker. (Tr. 738-742; Ab. 106-107; Tr. 
788; Ab. 106; Tr. 569, 470; Ab. 65; Tr. 585; Ab. 68; and Tr. 884; Ab. 204) 
(See also pp. 16ofthis Brief, supra.) 
Uncertain and speculative testimony plainly cannot be the basis for so essa 
tial a determination as causation. Defendant is bound to remove the issue of pro· 
cause from the realm of speculation by establishing facts affording a logical basis 
for the inference which he claims. It is submitted that in this case the evidence 
presented failed to meet this standard required to submit the matter to the jury. 
(57 Am. Jur. 2d, Negligence, § 141) Consideration of relevant Utah cases demon· 
strates this pr.inciple, and show distinctions which place the case at bar outside 
,the parameter of permissible inference for establishment of proximate cause by 
circumstantial evidence. 
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In Utah Cooperative Association v. Egbert-Hader lie Hog Farms, Inc. , 
550 P .2d 196 (Utah 1976), a suit was brought on an open account to recover for 
the sale of livestock feed whereupon the buyer counterclaimed alleging that the 
feed was contaminated. This Court noted that the feed supplied to defendant was 
off-color and malodorous, unlike previous food shipments; that a chemical analysis 
of the food samples taken from defendant's "weather tight" feed bins showed a presence 
of salmonella; and that defendant's veterinarian diagnosed salmonella poisoning 
of his hogs. Based upon such direct foundational evidence, the court held that 
sufficient evidence had been presented from which a jury could reasonably find 
that the contamination was a direct result of plaintiff's preparation of the feed, 
and that contamination resulted from the processing. In so holding, the Utah Supreme 
Court reversed the lower court's directed verdict in favor of the seller of the feed 
and noted: 
It is not necessary that the defendant show absolute 
certainty that the source of infection among the hogs arose 
from the ingredients supplied by the plaintiff, but it is suffi-
cient if there is substantial evidence to support the likelihood 
that the infection came from that source. Id. at 198 [Emphasis 
added.] 
Unlike the Utah Coop case, where the feed defendant actilally purchased 
was found to contain salmonella, no direct evidence was introduced in this case 
regarding a deficiency in crude protein or excess in urea in the actual IFA feed 
defendant purchased. Furthermore, in the case at bar no professional diagnosis 
was made as to the problems with Fitzgerald's herd or as to cause of such problems. 
Based on the standards set forth in Utah Coop, the evidence presented in the case 
at bar was insufficient to support the likelihood that defendant's claimed problems 
were linked to the lntermountain Farmers feed. 
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Likewise, this Court in Farmers Grain Coop. v. Fredrickson, 7 Utah 2a 
180, 321 P .2d 926 (1958) held that the evidence was sufficient to justify an inle 
that the feed in question was deficient and that such deficiency proximately ca 
the grower's damage. In that case, the grain cooperative sued to foreclos~ an 
and mortgage executed by a turkey grower, who in turn counterclaimed for b 
of warranty and negligence claiming nutritional deficiency in the feed sold to h' 
by the cooperative. But in the Farmers Grain case, there was careful elirnina' 
of all other possible or probable causes of the damages by direct and competent 
evidence. Stich negating' causation was absent in the case at bar. 
The distinctions between the Farmers Grain case and the present case b 
the Court are numerous and of critical importance. The evidence which was f 
by this Court in the Farmers Grain case to be competent evidence, from which 
jury could infer that the feed was deficient and that such deficiency proximatefy 
caused the turkey grower's damages , even though no actual analysis of the feed 
was made, included the following: 
* All feed eaten by defendant-counterclaimant's turkeys was purchased 
the plaintiff-feed manufacturer. 
* There was a "control" group of all other turkey poults from the samell!1 
hatches as defendant's poults, and from which a distinct contrast could readily 
drawn when compared with defendant's poults. All poults in this "control" 
were received by the turkey growers in good condition, as were defendant's P 
none of the poults in the control group were fed Farmers Grain feed; all of the 
in the control group had normal growth rates and no physical problems, whereas 
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defendant's turkeys had dry feathers and cankerous mouths, and were stunted in 
their growth . 
* Six poults from the same hatch, including defendant's poults were examined 
at the Department of Veterinary Science at Utah State University; only defsndant's 
poults showed a nutritional deficiency. 
* An expert witness testified that defendant's brooding conditions were ideal 
and that based on his examination of the poults he suspected vitamin deficiency. 
* All other turkey growers who purchased poults from the same hatches as 
defendant, none of whom used Farmers Grain feed, testified that they had no prob-
lems with their turkeys. 
The evidence presented in the instant case, however, was insufficient to 
provide such a basis from which the jury could reasonably infer that the IFA feed 
which defendant purchased was defective. In the case at bar, the following distin-
guishing evidence was presented: 
* Plaintiff's feed constituted less than one-half of the total matter consumed by 
defendant's cows each day. Defendant's cows also ate alfalfa and corn silage in sub-
stantial quantities. (Tr. 1014; Ab. 135) 
* There was no control group to compare with the defendant's herd as to con-
ditions, feed, or physical problems. However, Exhibits 57-P through 63-P show 
a comparison of defendant's milk production per cow with other Salt Lake County 
herds. That comparison shows that in 1970 before defendant began using plaintiff's 
feed, the milk production of his herd was less than the Salt Lake County average 
and that the production of his herd increased steadily and by 1974 exceeded the Salt. 
Lake County average by 1,688 pounds. (See pp. 3-4 of this Brief, supra.) 
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* No autopsies or examinations were ever performed on defendant's cow 
s to 
determine what the specific problems with his cows were. (l'r. 1121-1122; Ab. 
11 
180) 
* Blair Thomas and Ferris Fitzgerald, other dairy farmers in defendant's 
locality, testified as to their use of plaintiff's feed without adverse effects. err. 
1178, 796; Ab. 117, 121; Tr. 920-922; Ab. 214-215) See footnote 5, p. 38 ofthis 
Brief, supra. 
A factual situation similar to that in the Farmers Grain case existed in Park 
v. Moorman Mfg. Co., 121 Utah 339, 241 P .2d 914 (1952). Park brought an 
action against Moorman for breach of warranty as to fitness of poultry feed concen 
Moorman appealed the jury verdict in favor of Park, claiming that there was ins 
evidence to justify the inference that Park's loss was the proximate result of the 
use of either the feed produced by Moorman or the feeding plan propounded by 
Moorman. In ii.ffirming the jury verdict, the Utah Supreme Court reasoned as fo 
Appellant further contends that the evidence in this case is 
insufficient to justify the inference that plaintiff's loss was 
the proximate result of the use of either the feed or the method 
of feeding or both. The record contains testimony of defendant's 
own veterinarian that the feed or plan could have caused plain-
tiff's loss. There was further testimony of other witnesses who 
had used the feed and had had undesirable results. The 
inferences drawn by officers of defendant com_pany and by 
buyers· from plaintiff that the chickens on defendant's feed 
and plan were far below the other chickens on the other 
plan, and that such condition came within a significant period 
after defendant's feed and plan were adopted is further evidence 
of proximate cause. This question of proximate cause is like-
wise a jury question. Taking the evidence most favorable to 
the plaintiff, there is substantial evidence established by the 
record to support the jury's implied finding as to proximate 
cause of the loss. Id. at 920 . [Emphasis added.] 
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The evidence presented in Park v. Moorman, supra was direct and per-
suasive in excluding other possible causes of damages, leaving the only reasonably 
likely inference that the f~ed in question was the culprit. In the instant case, how-
ever, a much different situation is presented. Here, the evidence presented was 
insufficient to raise either the inference that plaintiff's feed was deficient or the 
inference that it proximately caused defendant's claimed damages. Dairy-farmers 
Ferris Fitzgerald and Blair Thomas, testified that they had used plaintiff's feed 
many years, including during the time periods pertinent to the present suit, but 
never experienced any adverse effect. (Tr. 922; Ab. 215; Tr. 930; Ab. 218) 
Unlike the situation in Park v. Moorman, supra, defendant did not introduce any 
witnesses who could testify that they had problems when they used plaintiff's feed. 
i 
.I, 
ii' 
:f: ifl'i 
Furthermore, Exhibits 57-P - 63-P, reflect yearly comparisons between the defendant's :1: 
dairy during the material times in question, and the average of Salt Lake County i ' 
herds, which indicate that defendant's herd was constantly in~reasing its production 
in relation to the other herds in the test area. (Directly opposite from the situation 
in Moorman.) As noted, defendant failed to introduce evidence to show , for example, 
that weather conditions and seasonal changes, changes in the herd's location, 
hoof trimming, disease and other obvious possible explanations did not cause a 
reduction in milk production of the dairy herd and the other symptoms of Fitzgerald's 
herd. (See pp. 13-20 of Brief, supra) Defendant's expert stated in his examination 
that if a cow was fed excessive amounts of urea, in the grain, the symptoms of 
such toxicity would be apparent from one-half hour up to three or four hours after 
the consumption of excess urea, whereas defendant and his help testified that his 
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cows were bloating from 8 to 12 hours after consuming the grain. (Tr. 780-78!; 
Ab. 117) 
The Utah Court has recognized that use of circumstantial evidence to ere~· 
"I 
an inference of proximate cause is suspect and subject to scrutiny. Denver & 
R.G.R. Co. v. Ashton-Whyte-Skillicorn Co., 49 Utah 82, 162 Pac. 83 (1916); 
Lindsay v. Gibbons and Reed, 27 Utah 2d 419, 497 P .2d 28 (1972). In the c&< 
at bar, the circumstances which supposedly would create the inference of pro· 
cause cannot stand the light of day. The circumstances could just as well be use' 
to create an inference that any number of things may have caused the alleged p · 
and damages of defendant. For instance, several witnesses testified that there 
were various milkers involved with defendant's cows, that the cows changed lo 
and that these factors could cause milk production loss. (Tr. 78; Ab. 106; Tr. 
583; Ab. 63; Tr. 585; Ab. 68; Tr. 594; Ab. 69; Tr. 641; Ab. 81; Tr. 679; Ab. 
89. See also pp. 13-16 of this Brief, supra.) Defendants expert was asked to ass 
the directly contrary hypothesis that only ~ milker was involved . (Tr. 739; 
Ab. 107) Isn't there hereby created the logical and reasonable likelihood that 
changes in milkers and locations caused milk production loss? Isn't that inferen 
just as likely as that the plaintiff's feed caused the milk production loss, particu 
when the unrefuted evidence showed actual increase in milk production of defeno 
cows during the periods the animals were eating plaintiff's feed as compared to 
previous when other feed was used? (See Exhibit 63-P and pp. 3-4 of this Brief. 
supra.) Similar analysis could demonstrate the reasonable likelihood and plaus 
of other factors as causative of the other problems asserted by plaintiff, such as 
the effects of sickness in the herd, weather conditions, hoof trimming and other 
unexplained and uneliminated possible causes. 
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E. Insufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence to Create Inference of Damages 
A universally recognized principle governing the recovery of damages is 
that "damages must be certain, both in their nature and in respect to the cause 
from which they proceed." This principle has been modified to allow the recovery 
of damages where they are proved with only reasonable certainty; however, damages 
are not recoverable when the trier of facts must rely upon evidence which leaves 
those damages uncertain or speculative. Recognizing this principle, the Utah 
Supreme Court in B. T. Moran, Inc. v. First Security Corporation, 82 Utah 
316, 24 P .2d 384 (1933) stated that: 
There is no finding of any fact on which damages in any 
specific amount can rest .... The element of damages is 
so speculative, and the cause of damages so uncertain on the 
record before us, as to afford no basis for a judgment in favor 
of the defendant. Id. at 389 , 390. 
Accord: Security Development Co. v. Fedco, Inc., 23 Utah 2d 306, 462 P .2d 
706 (1969); Robinson v. Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d 261, 409 P .2d 121 (1965); and 
Telluride Power Co. v. Williams, 172 F .2d 673 (10th Cir. 1949). 
In the case at bar, no competent evidence was introduced upon which the 
jury could reasonably base an award of damages. The testimony of the defendant 
as to his damages was wholly unsupported, and in fact was soundly contradicted lj' 
11! 
i'I, by many of defendant's own witnesses and exhibits. (See pp. 24-29 of Brief, supra.) !fr 
Item: Defendant testified that 42 of his cows died of bloat caused by urea, 
causing a loss of $33,000.00. (Tr. 1042-1050; Ab. 145-147) Even assuming that 
there was a causal connection (a point steadfastly denied), the DHIA records admitted 
in evidence showed only 22 of defendant's cows as having died during the time 
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in question (Tr. 333; Ab. 22), and defendant's milkers could testify only as to 
seven cows that died of bloat. (Tr. 610; Ab. 72; Tr. 661; Ab. 86; Tr. 680; Ab. 
90) 
Item: Defendant claimed that he had to sell 136 cows for beef because they 
became unproductive as a result of consuming plaintiff's feed. (Tr. 1076-1080; 
Ab. 155-156; Tr. 1133-1142; Ab. 182-183; Tr. 1158-1167; Ab. 188-192) The 
DHIA records admitted in evidence show that only 87 of defendant's cows were 
soldforbeefduringthepertinenttimeperiods. (Tr. 334; Ab. 22) 
In several instances, the testimony of defendant as to alleged damages was 
based upon documents never admitted into evidence or excluded from evidence: 
*Values defendant placed on the cow deaths were allegedly taken from his 
tax records, which were never introduced into evidence, and the only exhibit 
reflecting such losses, Exhibit 138, was refused admission into evidence by the 
lower court. (See p. 20 of Irief, supra.) 
* Defendant referred to his unintroduced alleged tax records to determine 
the losses he sustained by reason of the sale of his cows , but the only exhibit whi 
set forth the defendant's claimed losses, Exhibit 146, was refused admission into 
evidence. (Seep. 20 of Brief, supra.) 
Perhaps the most uncertain of all "evidence" as to damages was the unsup-
ported claims by defendant as to which the jury was left to speculate: 
Item: Defendant testified that he incurred $98,600 .00 in additional expens~ 
and costs in order to maintain his cows beyond the normal lactation period· (Tr. 
1065-1069; ab. 152-153) No receipts, bills, cancelled checks, or bookkeeping 
records were introduced to support defendant's claim. 
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Item: Defendant claimed with respect to Count V, that he sustained alleged 
increased costs to maintain his production level, as to Count VI that he sustained 
additional costs for the greater volume of grain consumed, as to Count VII that there 
was over payment because protein was deficient. In none of these instances, how-
ever, were the exhibits prepared by defendant regarding his claimed losses admitted 
for jury consideration because they were prepared from documents not evidence, 
such as the Dairy Herd Management article and the U .S .D .A. grain-milk ratios 
relied on by defendant in computing his damages. (See pp. 27-28 ofthis Brief, 
supra.) Such exhibits were rejected by the Court. 
*Defendant claimed $124,053.00 in damages for loss of milk production. 
Defendant prepared Exhibit 139 as to his milk losses from his alleged tax records 
and the alleged Beatrice Foods-Meadow Gold Dairy receipts which were not offered 
or introduced into evidence. (See pp. 22-23 of Brief, supra.) Exhibit 139 was 
refused admission into evidence, but defendant nevertheless was permitted to 
read from the refused exhibit verbatim to the jury. (See pp. 22-23 of Brief, supra.) 
No competent evidence on which to determine the amount of damages, if 
any, was presented to the jury, and it is submitted that the evidence relating to 
the award of over $226,000 .00 in damages was legally insufficient. 
POINT IV. 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR WAS COMMITTED 
IN THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE 
The errors assigned herein have to do with prejudicial admission of exhibits, 
testimony based upon documents and matters not in evidence, conduct of defendant 
in reading from exhibits which had been excluded or refused, and things of that 
nature. 
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A. Prejudicial Admission of Exhibits 
It is submitted that admission into evidence of exhibits which were remote 
in time and place, over strenuous and consistent objection of counsel, constituted 
prejudicial error. This embraces all chemical tests and exhibits referred to at pi 
6-9 of this Brief, which includes exhibits prior and subsequent to the relevant 
times. The aforesaid exhibits were offered as related solely to notice (punitive 
damages) , before the matter of negligence had been established or proved (whici 
it never was) . Proof of negligence was and is a foundational necessity before !hi 
matter of punitive damages can be gone into. But in this case, the opposite pro-
cedure was employed: proof admittedly and pointedly pertinent only to punitive 
damages was introduced, and then the jury was allowed to speculate and inferthi 
that very evidence could be the basis for a finding of negligence. This is boots 
ping at its worst. 
In Menefee v. Blitz, 181 Ore. 100, 179 P. 2d 550, 561 (1947), the court hek 
When the admissibility of an item of evidence is dependent 
upon the submission of preliminary proof in the form of "a founda-
tion" or, to use a different term a condition precedent, the~ 
who offers the dependent testimony must submit the preliminary 
proof or establish the condition precedent before the dependent 
fact can be deemed admissible. See Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd 
Ed. , § 654, and 32 C .J. S. , Evidence, § 838, p. 768. The recep-
tion of dependent evidence in face of the fact that the preliminary 
proof was never submitted constitutes error: 5 C .J .S., Appeal 
and Error,§ 1725, p. 990. [Emphasis added.] 
The admissibility of the aforesaid exhibits of alleged similar prior acts injected 
collateral issues into the case and constituted error. 
In negligence actions, the courts have generally ruled 
inadmissible, on the issue of negligence or of contributory negli-
gence at the time of the injury complained of, evidence of similar 
prior acts of negligence of the defendant or the plaintiff on other 
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occasions. To admit evidence of prior acts of negligence would, it 
is said, inject collateral issues into the case and have a tendency 
to confuse the minds of the jury . 29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence , § 315 
at 361. 
B. Testimony Based upon Documents and Matters Not in Evidence 
Rule 70 of the Utah Rules of Evidence prohibits proof of the content of a 
writing, other than by the writing itself, except in certain circumstances not 
applicable in this case. That rule was violated in the extreme by permitting Mr. 
Fitzgerald to read and testify from rejected exhibits as to the content of Internal 
Revenue records, magazine articles and the like, which were referred to as the 
basis of the testimony, but never marked as exhibits or introduced into evidence. 
(See discussion infra, at pp. 20-23 of this Brief.) 
A prime example of the prejudicial effect and grave injustice which came 
about as a result of reference to non exhibits was the Beatrice Food ticket fiasco. 
(See pp. 22-23 of this Brief.) This was so egregious that the jury wanted to look 
at what it thought was a key set of damning exhibits, i.e., the Beatrice Food tickets, 
but had to be told at the direction of the judge in an unrecorded communication 
at the jury room that the tickets had never been introducted as exhibits. (See 
p. 23 of the Brief, supra.) 
The law is clear that testimony such as was given by defendant, not based 
upon the personal knowledge of defendant, has no probative value and constitutes 
error. Thus in Watson Land Co. v. Rio Grande Oil Co. , 61 C .A. 2d 269, 142 
P. 2d 950, 953 (1943) the court stated: 
The testimony of defendant's president, that the oil 
his company was producing had a gravity of less than 14, had 
no probative value, in view of facts that, as revealed by his 
subsequent answers, he did not speak of his own knowledge, 
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but based his statement on the "run tickets" of the refineries 
which bought the products of his wells, and there was no 
showing of the basis on which the run tickets were computed. 
C. Conduct of Defendant in Reading from Exhibits Excluded or Refused 
In determining the losses defendant claims to have sustained, he prepared 
various summaries and charts containing detailed information as to how he arrive: 
at his losses. (See pp. 20-23 of this Brief, supra.) These summaries included: 
Exhibits 138-D - "Cow Deaths"; Exhibit 139-D - "Milk Losses"; Exhibit 146-D. 
"Cows Sold for Beef''; and Exhibit 163-D - "60 Retarded Cows." Each of these 
exhibits were compiled through use of the DHIA records , (admitted in evidence) 
defendant's alleged tax records, ~ot admitted in evidence) , his memory, and" 
sources which he deems to be reliable." (Tr. 1042-1048; Ab. 145-147; Tr. 1011 
1080, 1133-1142, 1158-1167; Ab. 155-156, 182-183, 188-192; Tr. 1065-1069; Ab. 
152-153; Tr. 1074-1076; Ab. 154-155; Tr. 1157-1158; Ab. 188; Tr. 1050-1053;Ab 
148-149) The DHIA records were previously received into evidence, but did nol 
contain all the information contained on the proposed exhibits, such as cause old 
reason culled, value of cow , or value of lost milk production , if any . The def 
alleged tax records were never introduced nor offered into evidence, even thoug~ 
his alleged tax records supposedly contained such information as cow deaths, 
and cause of death, cows sold for beef, and the reason for such sale, and 
losses thereby sustained, and receipts for the sale of milk to dairies, such 85 
the Beatrice Foods-Meadow Gold Dairy receipts. (See pp. 20-23 of Brief, ~.) 
The aforesaid information from the alleged tax records was crucial to the claimed 
values in connection with loss of milk production. Each of the aforesaid exhibits 
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were offered into evidence, but the Court reserved ruling thereupon until after 
cross-examination by the plaintiff. (Exhibit 138-D; Tr. 1049; Ab. 147; Exhibit 
146-D; Tr. 1077; Ab. 155; Exhibit 139-D; Tr. 1054; Ab. 149; Exhibit 163-D; Tr. 
1079-1081; Ab. 156) The Court thereafter properly sustained plaintiff's objection 
as to each said exhibit and refused admission of Exhibits 138-D, 139-D, 146-D, 
and 163-D into evidence. (Tr. 1153-1156; Ab . 186-18 7) 
Although the aforesaid exhibits were refused, the unsubstantiated information 
contained in those exhibits was nevertheless presented directly to the jury, 
for its full consideration, by way of defendant's verbatim reading of those exhibits. 
A comparison of the proposed exhibits to defendant's testimony with respect to 
cow deaths, sale of cows for beef, retarded cows and loss of milk production readily 
confirms the fact the defendant read from the refused exhibits. (Exhl"bit 138-D; 
Tr. 1042-1048; Ab. 145-147; Exhibit 139-D; Tr. 1076-1080, 1133-1142; 1158-1167; 
Ab. 155-156, 182-183, 188-192; Exhibit 146-D; Tr. 1065-1069; 1074-1076, 1157-1158; 
Ab. 152-153, 154-155, 189; Exhibit 163-D; Tr. 1050-1053;· Ab. 148-149) 
With respect to defendant's reading of Exhibit 146-D "Cows Sold for Beef" 
a discussion was held between the court and defendant's counsel during which 
the court, recognizing the questionable propriety of such conduct, refused to 
permit Mr. Fitzgerald to read from that proposed exhibit or the notes he used in 
the preparation thereof. (Tr. 1081-1085; Ab . 156-158) Notwithstanding, after 
Exhibit 146-D was refused admission into evidence, the court permitted the defen-
dant to "Start at the front and go clear through" that exhibit, (Tr. 1158; Ab. 188) 
reading all the information from that refused exhibit directly into the record. 
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The court, noting that the milk production information contained on the refused 
exhibit could be searched out from the DHIA records, suggested that the defendant 
read only the cow number, percentage of the herd and the loss sustained categori 
from the exhibit, (Tr. 1162-1163; Ab. 190) i.e. , the very information from defen 
alleged tax records not introduced into evidence which was the basis for the couM: 
refusal to admit the exhibits into evidence. (Tr. 188-189; Ab. 187) 
The information contained in proposed Exhibits 138-D, 139-D, 146-D and 
163-D, deemed insufficient by the court to be admitted as exhibit evidence, was 
nevertheless before the jury, for its evaluation by reason of defendant's sole 
testimony. The jury was at no time admonished to disregard that information 
read to them by the defendant from the exhibits refused into evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, it is submitted that substantial error was 
committed in the long and confusing trial of this case. Evidence admitted or 
limited to the narrow issue of punitive damages was permitted to be considered 
by the jury for all purposes. Circumstantial evidence relating to one or perhaps 
two samples of allegedly contaminated feed out of many samples of unadulterated 
feed was regarded by the court as justifying a virtual direction that the issue 
of negligence was established as a matter of law. Incompetent evidence was 
admitted upon which inferences were constructed--with the result that an inferen 
of negligence became the basis for an inference of proximate cause. Testimony 
directly from excluded or refused exhibits was permitted, as was testimony based 
upon hearsay records never offered or admitted into evidence. The evidence 
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on damages was speculative and uncertain. In short, it is submitted that under 
the totality of the circumstances, it would be manifest injustice not to reverse the 
verdict of the jury. 
This Court should reverse the judgment in favor of defendant on the 
Counterclaim and direct the trial court to grant plaintifrs Motion for Directed 
Verdict. Attorney's fees should be added to the judgment in favor of plaintiff 
as a matter of law . In the alternative, this Court should vacate the verdict and 
remand the case for new trial. 
DATED: February 28, 1977. 
L 
Respectfully submitted, 
CALLISTER, GREENE & NEBEKER 
~D>~C. PllilL 
orothYCPleshe. 
800 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Ut1$ 84133 
DeLyle H. Condie 
1224 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
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Matted two copies of the foregoing thisc9~day of February 1977, to ThomJ 
R. Blonquist, 431 South Third East, Salt Lake City, utah, 84111, attorney for 
respondent, postage prepaid. 
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